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Abstract—Previous generations of face recognition algorithms
differ in accuracy for images of different races (race bias).
Here, we present the possible underlying factors (data-driven
and scenario modeling) and methodological considerations for
assessing race bias in algorithms. We discuss data-driven
factors (e.g., image quality, image population statistics, and
algorithm architecture), and scenario modeling factors that
consider the role of the “user” of the algorithm (e.g., threshold
decisions and demographic constraints). To illustrate how
these issues apply, we present data from four face recognition
algorithms (a previous-generation algorithm and three deep
convolutional neural networks, DCNNs) for East Asian and
Caucasian faces. First, dataset difficulty affected both overall
recognition accuracy and race bias, such that race bias in-
creased with item difficulty. Second, for all four algorithms,
the degree of bias varied depending on the identification
decision threshold. To achieve equal false accept rates (FARs),
East Asian faces required higher identification thresholds than
Caucasian faces, for all algorithms. Third, demographic con-
straints on the formulation of the distributions used in the test,
impacted estimates of algorithm accuracy. We conclude that
race bias needs to be measured for individual applications
and we provide a checklist for measuring this bias in face
recognition algorithms.
1. Introduction
Scientists have over 50 years of experience studying the
effects of race on human face recognition ability. People
recognize faces of their “own” race more accurately than
faces of “other” races [1]. This phenomenon is referred to
as the “other-race effect” (ORE). The study of race bias
in computational algorithms, likewise, has a nearly 30-year
history that converges on the following finding. Nearly all
of the face recognition algorithms studied over the past
30 years show some performance differences as a function
of the race of the face. As race bias is investigated in
deep convolutional neural network (DCNN) algorithms, it is
important to consider the lessons learned from both human-
and machine-based studies of race bias in face recognition
over the last many decades [1], [2].
First, we review the combined effects of subject and race
of face on face recognition by humans. Second, we review
race bias findings for face recognition algorithms. These
findings can guide us as we move from previous-generation
(simpler) algorithms to present-day DCNNs. These latter
algorithms require massive amounts of training data and em-
ploy large numbers of local, non-linear computations. Third,
we discuss critical, but often overlooked, considerations in
measuring face recognition bias in algorithms. Fourth, we
will apply the lessons we have learned from the past to
measure performance bias in DCNN-based face recognition
systems. Specifically, we present novel data from three
DCNNs and one previous-generation algorithm, using a
dataset in which the challenge level of the comparison items
varies. This allows us to measure the effects of two races on
performance, as a function of item difficulty. This analysis
is especially important for newer DCNN algorithms, which
show high accuracy for all but the most challenging stim-
ulus items. We will see that concerns about race bias are
magnified, as item difficultly increases. We conclude with a
checklist and discussion of considerations to bear in mind
when assessing bias in algorithms. Our goal is to better
understand how to measure and interpret race bias in face
recognition algorithms.
1.1. Other-race effect - Humans
The ORE for humans has been found across mul-
tiple racial/ethnic groups using different methodological
paradigms [1], [3]. This effect is measured in an experimen-
tal paradigm, whereby subjects of different races are tested
on their ability to recognize faces of two (or more) races.
Formally, the effect is defined by a statistical interaction
between the race of the subject and the race of the face. This
interaction shows a relative accuracy advantage for own-race
faces over other-race faces.
Previous research has demonstrated that expertise in rec-
ognizing faces comes, in part, from meaningful experiences
with the faces across the lifespan [4], [5], beginning in in-
fancy [6], [7]. Indeed, race biases in face identification have
been found across different age groups [8], [9], [10]. Thus,
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psychologists have concluded that the power to recognize
faces with high accuracy comes from experience discrimi-
nating among individuals from a homogeneous population
of highly similar faces (i.e., faces of one’s own race) [3], [5],
[11], [12], [13]. This experience enables the development of
neural features that maximize encoding differences among
faces within the group. By this account, the ORE for humans
is due to the fact that we represent faces of our own-race
with a highly effective specialized set of features. These
features are not well suited to encode the unique character
of other-race faces. Consequently, the experience-dependent
nature of human expertise for faces is both a strength and
weakness of the human perceptual system. Experience helps
us to tune our perceptual systems to rely on features that
are optimally suited to faces of our own race, but at the cost
of identification performance for faces of other races.
Lesson 1. The fact that the ORE has been replicated
across multiple races of subjects and faces, combined with
findings that experience affects face recognition accuracy
in predictable ways, leads us to two conclusions. First,
human face recognition ability is characterized by an ORE,
whereby performance is relatively more accurate for faces
of one’s own race. Second, psychological findings support
the assumption that faces of all races should be equally
recognizable, if one applies appropriate features to analyze
a particular race of faces.
1.2. Racial Bias - Algorithms
Given that humans show an other-race effect for face
recognition, it is not surprising that previous research has
investigated the effects of race on the accuracy of face
recognition algorithms [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20],
[21]. For obvious reasons, these effects focus generally on
race bias (accuracy differences as function of stimulus race)
and not the other-race effect (interaction between the race
of the face and race of stimulus). To clarify, as we use
it here, race bias denotes algorithm accuracy differences
across groups of faces that vary in race. The integration
of state-of-the-art face recognition algorithms in applied
settings (e.g., airports) underscores the importance of mea-
suring the effects of race on the accuracy of face recognition
algorithms. In what follows, we divide this review of race
bias in face recognition algorithms into studies that examine
previous-generation algorithms and those that study DCNNs
(cf., also for brief overview of this topic see [22]).
1.2.1. Pre-DCNN Algorithms. Differences in the accuracy
of face recognition algorithms as a function of race have
been reported consistently since the early 1990’s. One of the
first studies to demonstrate a race bias in algorithms exam-
ined early neural network models based on auto-associative
learning and principal components analysis (PCA) [2]. This
study showed that experience-based computational models
are influenced by race, but only when the basic features used
to encode faces were derived from the statistical structure of
the training data. The model was trained with either Asian
faces, as the minority race, and Caucasian faces, as the
majority race, or vice-versa. The authors found greater iden-
tification accuracy for majority-race faces than for minority-
race faces, regardless of whether Caucasian or Asian faces
were the majority/minority. This suggests that identification
accuracy was greater for the race with which the model had
greater “experience”.
A decade later, researchers examined the performance of
face recognition models from the early 2000’s for faces of
different races [14]. These models likewise showed differ-
ential accuracy as a function of the race of the face, but only
when the features used to represent faces were derived from
training. Models based on dynamic link architectures, which
use preset (hard-coded) features from the visual image, did
not show bias, whereas models based on PCA did [23].
Race bias for algorithms has been studied also using
race as a covariate [15], [16]. In 2004, Givens et al. found
that covariates, such as race, differentially affected algo-
rithm accuracy [15]. Covariates were measured for three
algorithms [24], [25], [26]. Non-Caucasian subjects were
easier to recognize than Caucasian subjects. Similarly, in a
subsequent study, the three best algorithms from a 2004-
2006 algorithm competition [27] showed that images of
non-Caucasians (with the exception of African-Americans1)
were recognized more accurately than Caucasian images.
Comparable results were found using a fused algorithm of
the top three performing algorithms in a 2006 algorithm
competition [16]. Here, non-Caucasian faces (mostly Asian)
were identified more accurately than Caucasian faces. How-
ever, the effect of race was smaller than the effect of other
factors, such as face size and environment (indoor or outdoor
setting). Taken together, these studies show that race, as a
covariate, impacts algorithms in ways that are not easy to
predict.
In 2011, Phillips et al. further explored the effects of
race and found that the origin of the algorithm (i.e., the
part of the world where it was developed) mediates race
bias in algorithms [17]. They compared two fused algo-
rithms: a Western algorithm (created from a fusion of 8
Western algorithms) and an East Asian algorithm (created
from a fusion of 5 East Asian algorithms). Both algorithms
demonstrated an other-race effect for face identification. The
Western algorithm performed more accurately for Caucasian
faces and the East Asian algorithm was more accurate for
East Asian faces. This is the only study that shows that algo-
rithm origin can predict race bias. The algorithms tested in
this study were “black-box” algorithms (the algorithms and
their implementations were unknown to the researchers who
tested for race bias). Differences in the racial composition of
the training datasets for Western and East Asian algorithms
may have contributed to the race bias.
Perhaps the best known and most comprehensive com-
parison done on pre-DCNN algorithms was reported in 2012
[18]. In that study, Klare et al., examined the role of demo-
graphics on the accuracy of three commercial off-the-shelf
algorithms (COTS), in addition to three in-house algorithms
1. Terms used to describe racial/ethnic groups are used as they appear
in the original published papers.
(two non-trainable and one trainable algorithm). Researchers
tested effects of race (Black, White, and Hispanic), gender
(male/female) and age (young: 18 to 30, middle-aged: 30
to 50, and old: 50 to 70). The results converged on the
finding that performance for young, Black, and female faces
suffered relative to other demographic groups across all
algorithms. Additionally, the authors found that equitable
training across all groups (for the trainable algorithms)
reduced the effects of specific demographics biases, but did
not eliminate them.
1.2.2. DCNN Algorithms. In 2014, the accuracy and gener-
alizability of face recognition algorithms increased markedly
with the introduction of algorithms based on DCNNs. These
networks employ a series of pooling and convolution opera-
tions across multiple layers of simulated neurons. The result
of the computations is a compressed representation of a face
at the top-layer of network [28]. This face descriptor can be
examined directly to evaluate the quality of face codes as a
function of race and other demographic variables.
Given the prominence of automatic face recognition
in social media and security, it is important to know
whether these new algorithms show race biases similar
to those seen in previous-generation algorithms. To date,
only a few studies have examined race bias in DCNNs
trained for face recognition [19], [20], [21], [29], [30].
In 2016, El Khiyari et al. evaluated algorithm accuracy
using single- and multi-class demographic groups including:
gender (male/female), age (young, middle age, older adult),
and race (Caucasian/Black). Two algorithms were tested: a
COTS face recognition algorithm and a publicly available
DCNN (VGG-Face algorithm [31]) [19]. In the single-
class demographics group, accuracy for both algorithms was
lower for female, Black, and young groups. These results
replicated previous research on older generation algorithms
[18]. Notably, although VGG-Face had a greater overall
verification accuracy, it also performed more accurately for
images of Caucasians than for images of Black individuals,
and showed more race bias than the COTS algorithm. For
multi-class demographic group comparisons, accuracy var-
ied widely. Over all comparisons, however, accuracy was
greatest for middle-aged White males and was lowest for
young Black females.
Cook et al. (2019) tested the effect of demographics
on eleven commercial systems (specific algorithms not dis-
closed) [29]. Each algorithm acquired images from 363
subjects (mostly Black or African-American and White in-
dividuals), across multiple demographic groups. Covariate
results showed that skin reflectance had the greatest impact
on performance. Lower (darker) skin reflectance was asso-
ciated with longer acquisition times and lower same-identity
distribution similarity scores across all systems. Following
this, Howard et al. (2019) tested Black or African-American
and White faces on a “leading commercial algorithm” [30].
False accept rates (FARs) were greater for White males than
for Black males. These results are at odds with previous and
subsequent literature (see [18], [19], [20], [21]). The authors
suggest that these contradictory results could be explained
by the diverse age range in their dataset.
Krishnapriya et al. [20] compared accuracy for African
American and Caucasian faces across four algorithms: two
COTS algorithms, VGG-Face (a DCNN), and a ResNet-
based DCNN [32]. The newer of the two COTS and the
ResNet algorithm performed best on African American
faces. By contrast, VGG-Face and the older COTS per-
formed better on Caucasian faces. Further evidence of race
bias was found in the thresholds functions for FARs, which
differed for African American faces and Caucasian faces.
(Threshold functions will be discussed in the next section).
In the same study, the effect of photo quality on estimates
of race bias was also examined [20]. Results showed that
overall accuracy improved when only International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO)-complaint images were used
in the analysis. These results provide additional evidence of
race bias in newer DCNNs, as well as a first look at how
image quality can affect accuracy performance.
Most recently, a comprehensive report of demographic
effects on face recognition algorithms was released by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [21].
State-of-the-art algorithms from industry and academics vol-
unteered to be tested. Performance was measured on four
United States (U.S.) government face image databases that
consisted of: (a) U.S. domestic mugshots, (b) immigration
benefits application photographs from a global population,
(c) Visa application photographs, and (d) border crossing
photographs of travelers entering the U.S. At the time of
release, the authors reported results “on over 18.27 million
images of 8.49 million people from 189 (mostly commer-
cial) algorithms from 99 developers” (pp.1)2.
The mugshot database was labeled with ethnic/racial
metadata. For the other three data sets, the majority race of
the country-of-origin of the photo served as the proxy for the
demographic label. The authors limited the countries in their
analysis to those countries where a single race of ethnicity
dominated. The report lists experimental results on all four
data sets, their demographic labels, and numerous scenarios.
Across these experimental conditions, there is one common
meta-result, race bias over the algorithms tested varies sub-
stantially, sometimes over orders of magnitude between the
least and most biased algorithm in an experiment. This meta-
result strongly recommends that system users measure bias
for each task. Because of the variability in bias, the detailed
information NIST provides on the performance of these face
recognition algorithms is highly valuable for researchers,
algorithm developers, users, and policy makers.
Lesson 2. Nearly all face recognition algorithms tested
in the past 30 years show performances differences as a
function of the race of the faces tested. In some cases,
algorithms have shown a “human-like” interaction between
the geographic origin of the algorithm and face race.
2. As of this writing, the NIST test is on-going, and accepting new
algorithm submissions for evaluation, see https://face.nist.gov.
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Figure 1. Signal Detection Model of Identification Accuracy. Similarity
score histograms for same-identity image pairs (pink) and different-identity
image pairs (teal) are shown. Decision thresholds (gray dotted line) spec-
ifies the similarity score cut-off for identification and determines false
rejection and false accept rates.
1.3. Measuring Face Identification Accuracy
Before we consider the measurement of race bias, we
digress briefly to discuss the standard procedures used for
measuring the accuracy of face recognition algorithms, in
general. As we will see, standard methods for measuring
algorithm accuracy partly underlie the difficulties we have
in estimating race bias in these systems. See [33] for further
discussion on this topic.
The standard approach to measuring the accuracy of
face recognition algorithms is based on Signal Detection
Theory (SDT) [34]. The problem is formulated as a face-
verification task whereby pairs of images, either of the
same person or of two different people, are compared. The
algorithm generates a similarity score that serves to index
the likelihood that the images show the same person (high
similarity) or two different people (low similarity). Accuracy
is measured based on the degree of overlap between the
similarity score distributions for different-identity pairs and
for same-identity pairs (See Fig 1).
Algorithm accuracy is summarized by the receiving op-
erating characteristic (ROC) curves and synopsized as the
area under this curve (AUC). A lower AUC score indicates
a larger overlap between the two distributions, which sug-
gests poorer discriminability. A higher AUC score indicates
a less overlap between the two distributions, and greater
discriminability. AUC = 0.5 indicates chance performance.
AUC = 1.0 indicates perfect accuracy. ROC and AUC scores
provide robust measures of overall algorithm accuracy over
the entire population of face image pairs in the distributions.
In applications, identification decisions require a thresh-
old similarity score, over which an image pair is judged
as an identity “match”. Once a threshold is set, additional
measures of identification accuracy become relevant. These
measures include false rejection rate (FRR) (proportion of
same-identity pairs that have been misjudged as different-
identity pairs) and false accept rate (FAR) (proportion of
different-identity pairs that have been misjudged as same-
identity pairs). Threshold placement determines algorithm
accuracy at specific FRR and FAR (see Fig. 1).
A common practice is to set a threshold that yields
a very small proportion of false accepts (e.g., 1/1,000,
1/10,000 or less). In an application, the critical measure
of accuracy then becomes the verification rate (VR) (same-
identity pairs correctly judged as same-identity pairs) at the
user-set threshold. A threshold function shows FAR as a
function of similarity score. As noted, threshold functions
may differ by face race. We will discuss this issue in greater
detail in the next section.
Lesson 3. Algorithm accuracy measures can summa-
rize the overall performance of a system (ROC and AUC)
based on the underlying distributions. Or, they can sum-
marize performance given both a user-set threshold and
the underlying distributions. Consequently, identification can
be measured with threshold-independent (ROC, AUC) or
threshold-dependent measures (e.g., VR @ FA=0.001). Both
types of measures serve a useful function, but they are
not guaranteed to converge. As we shall see in Section 2,
it is easy to understand how algorithms, which appear to
perform at ceiling for two races of faces using an AUC
(threshold-independent) measure, actually show small, but
potentially meaningful, differences in VR at the very low
FARs (threshold-dependent) required for scenarios. There-
fore, AUC, as a summary measure of the full range of poten-
tial thresholds, can sometimes be a misleading indication of
race bias. This is especially problematic when a machine is
required to operate at extreme points in the ROC function.
That said, at these extreme operating points performance
differences may apply to a small number of cases (i.e.,
stimuli in the tails of the distribution).
1.4. Factors underlying race bias
The underlying elements of race bias in algorithm per-
formance are easily seen once we understand how the prob-
lem of face identification is formulated. The issues can be
divided into data-driven and scenario-modeling issues.
1.4.1. Data-driven problems. It is clear that the race bias
in algorithm performance stems from the underlying same-
and different-identity distributions. The dilemma is that the
distribution parameters (e.g., means, standard deviations,
skews) that characterize the population as a whole, may
differ for particular demographic subgroups (race, age, gen-
der). Differences among the subgroup distributions explain
both everything and nothing about the underlying problem of
bias. What we would like to know is why these distributions
differ. Obvious possibilities include the following.
First, it is possible that an algorithm produces repre-
sentations that differ in quality (or uniqueness) for faces in
different subgroups. Characteristics of the algorithm, such as
the architecture or training data, may inadvertently produce
biased representations. An algorithm with poor quality rep-
resentations for particular subgroups would show race biases
with any dataset. When the quality of the representation
depends on adequate training with representative faces of
a subset, we should expect bias. The racial composition of
training datasets has been shown to effect the accuracy of
previous generation algorithms (e.g., [2], [18]).
The problem for DCNNs may be more challenging, be-
cause they must be trained with enormous numbers of real-
world (unconstrained) images. These images vary, not only
across demographics, but also in quality and image factors
(illumination, viewpoint, etc.). Therefore, it is difficult to
isolate the impact of the racial composition of the training
set on race bias. Because of the complexities of assessing
the impact of training sets on DCNNs, there are currently no
relevant results for these algorithms in the literature. Here,
we concentrate on bias in datasets used to test DCNNs.
These affect estimates of performance across race.
Second, demographic subgroups may be disproportion-
ately represented in the test (i.e., measurement) distribu-
tions, potentially resulting in errors in the estimation of
algorithm performance for certain demographic groups. For
example, algorithms that operate on a specific population,
should include test images representative of the individuals
in the population. Also, some caution is warranted in assum-
ing categorical structure for race with limited justification.
Specifically, in biological terms, race is not categorical, and
if we consider the issue from the more realistic perspective
of mixed-race individuals, the problem is more complex.
Third, it is possible, that the quality of the training or
test photographs differs across subgroups [20], [29], [35].
For example, Krishnapriya et al. [20] found that image
quality differences for the test faces explained some, but
not all, of the variation in race bias. When only ICAO-
compliant images were used to measure race bias, African
American and Caucasian face accuracy improved across all
four algorithms. The data on which race bias measurements
are computed can contribute to variable estimates of race
bias in face recognition algorithms.
Fourth, it is possible that nested subgroups of faces have
characteristics that amplify or hide bias effects. For example,
race bias effects may be stronger for female faces than for
male faces; or race bias may occur for challenging stimuli,
but not for easier stimuli. We will see an example of this
latter case in the experiment we present.
Lesson 4. Data-driven sources of race bias are defined
objectively by differences in the underlying distributions of
demographic sub-populations of faces. There are multiple
reasons why these differences might occur. The underly-
ing factors are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, in any
given scenario, one or more data-driven anomalies might
contribute to system bias.
1.4.2. Scenario-modeling. These are directly under the
control of the “user” and include: (a) thresholds effects
and (b) the formulation and control of the demographic
homogeneity of the different-identity distribution. Beginning
with thresholds, it is clear that a uniform threshold is not
adequate or equitable when the underlying sub-population
distributions differ. This is a concern with race bias. Previous
studies have shown that the threshold needed to achieve a
consistent FAR and/or VR varies across racial groups [20],
[35], [36]. These differences underscore the importance of
threshold shifts. Setting a single threshold for all racial
groups may produce different estimates of FAR and VRs
for different sub-groups of faces. This can be a source of
race bias in the operation of algorithms.
For example, O’Toole et al. (2012), measured identi-
fication accuracy for Asian and Caucasian faces for two
different stimulus sets using ROC curves and threshold
functions [36]. ROC curves showed a slight advantage for
Asian faces on the easier stimulus set, and an advantage for
Caucasian faces on the more difficult stimulus set. How-
ever, the threshold functions, which show the relationship
between similarity score and FAR, differed for the two
datasets. For both datasets, there was a greater threshold
shift for Asian faces than for Caucasian faces. This threshold
difference indicates that achieving equitable FARs across
both racial groups, would require setting a larger threshold
for Asian faces compared to Caucasian faces.
Threshold differences have been demonstrated also for
African American and Caucasian faces [20], [35]. As noted,
ROC curves showed that two out of four algorithms were
less race biased for African American faces compared to
Caucasian faces. However, despite this advantage, threshold
shifts for African American faces differed uniformly for
all four algorithms. For African American faces, all four
algorithms needed a higher threshold to achieve a given
FAR, and a lower threshold to achieve a given VR. These
results provide additional evidence that uniform thresholds
across race groups may produce different accuracy results
for each race group. This study [20] also provides evidence
that ROC curves can obscure information that threshold
functions reveal. See Lesson 3.
A second scenario-modeling concern involves the demo-
graphic homogeneity of the different-identity distribution.
Common practice is to measure algorithm accuracy with all
possible different-identity pairs as the baseline. However,
this practice can be problematic when different-identity pairs
also differ demographically (e.g., by race, gender, age) [36].
If this is the case, the distribution for different-identity pairs
will include demographic differences, in addition to identity
differences. Clearly, the average similarity score computed
for different-identity pairs that also differ in demographic
group will be lower than the average similarity score for
different-identity pairs within a homogeneous demographic.
This demographic heterogeneity can shift the position of the
different-identity distribution leftward, thereby artificially
inflating algorithm verification performance. A solution to
this problem is “yoking”. Yoking is defined as controlling
the different-identity distribution so that all different-identity
pairs are demographically comparable (e.g., same race, age,
gender) [36]. This constraint produces a more homogeneous
different-identity distribution (compared to including all
possible different-identities in the analysis) and provides a
more accurate assessment of accuracy and race bias.
Previous research demonstrates that yoking alters esti-
mates of algorithm accuracy [30], [36], [37]. O’Toole et
al. first demonstrated the effect of yoking on identification
performance measures for Asian and Caucasian faces [36].
Different-identity distributions were demographically con-
trolled in four groups: no control, race only, gender only,
race and gender. The authors found that overall accuracy
decreased with increased demographic control.
Lesson 5. Scenario-modeling problems are (partially)
under the control of the researcher and can directly impact
estimates of race bias. System-users should consider how
thresholds and yoking controls affect each race of interest
independently.
2. Race Bias in Face Identification Algorithms
In this section, we present an experiment that exam-
ined race bias as a function of stimulus difficulty, using
items previously calibrated for challenge-level (see Stimuli).
Four face recognition algorithms (one pre-DCNN and three
DCNNs) were tested on Caucasian and East Asian face
pairs. We also demonstrate the effects of yoking across race,
and across race and gender, on estimates of identification
accuracy across older and newer generations of DCNNs.
This experiment also serves to highlight demographic bias
issues that challenge algorithms in the context of the lessons
we have learned from previous work.
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Stimuli. Images were taken from a condensed set of
the Good, Bad, Ugly (GBU) Challenge dataset [38]. The par-
titions of the GBU dataset provide us with the opportunity to
compare race bias across algorithms and items (image pairs)
that vary in difficulty. The GBU dataset contains images
partitioned into three difficulty levels, referred to as: the
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. These difficulty partitions are
based on the similarity scores of the top three performers in
the Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) 2006 [39]. The
full GBU set contains 1,085 images of 437 identities in each
partition. The dataset includes frontal images that vary in
environment (e.g., indoors and outdoors) and demographics
(i.e., race, age, gender). The stimuli were captured using a
Nikon D70 6-megapixel single-lens reflex camera.3
All images were collected within a single academic year
at the University of Notre Dame [see [38] for full details on
how the GBU was compiled]. For the purposes of this study,
only a subset of the full GBU dataset was selected. First,
we restricted our analysis to images taken indoors, which
limited the variation in illumination as a confounding factor.
Second, given that East Asian and Caucasian faces repre-
sented the majority of images, only these two racial groups
were selected for comparison. Although this reduced the
race groups we were able to test, we chose the GBU dataset
for testing race bias because (1) race in the GBU dataset
is self-reported, (2) the conditions under which the images
were taken are identical across and within race groups, and
(3) age range is narrow, which limits other confounding
demographics. For this reason, our analysis was performed
on a condensed version of the GBU dataset (good: 385
identities; bad: 389 identities; ugly: 380 identities) (see Fig.
2 for a stimulus example).
3. The identification of any commercial product or trade name does not
imply endorsement or recommendation by NIST.
Figure 2. Example image pairs from the Good (a), the Bad (b), and the
Ugly (c) difficulty partitions. All six images are the same identity [38].
2.1.2. Algorithms. Four algorithms were used to compare
verification accuracy for East Asian and Caucasian faces:
A2011 [38], A2015 [31], A2019 [40], A2017b [41]. None
of the algorithms were trained on face images collected at
Notre Dame4. The A2011 algorithm is a fused algorithm
of three top performing algorithms in the FRVT 2006 con-
ducted by NIST. This fused algorithm pre-dates DCNNs,
and thus A2011 is the oldest algorithm we tested. This
algorithm was selected as a race-bias assessment of a pre-
DCNN face recognition algorithms. Moreover, A2011 has
been widely used in other comparisons [42], [43]. A2015 is
a publicly available DCNN and is commonly as a bench-
mark for performance of DCNNs. A2015 is an older, but
well established, DCNN that produces an output of 4,096-
dimensional feature vectors. Previous studies have shown a
race bias (greater verification accuracy for images of Cau-
casians compared to images of Blacks) for A2015 [19], [20].
The A2015 was selected because of its prominence in the
literature as a baseline measure of algorithm accuracy [19],
[20], [42], [44]. A2017b, which produces 512-dimensional
feature vector, is based on a ResNet-101 architecture and is
trained on about 5.7 million images. Most recently, A2017b
was found to be comparable in accuracy to that of forensic
facial examiners [44]. Finally, A2019 is based on an In-
ception architecture that produces 512-dimensional feature
vectors also, and is trained on close to one million images.
To our knowledge, no study has previously examined how
A2019 and A2017b perform on different racial groups. Both
A2017b and A2019 were selected because they represent
state-of-the-art algorithms with well-defined training data.
This study provides the first direct comparison of race
bias across a pre-DCNN algorithm, a previous generation
DCNN, and 2 high-performing DCNN algorithms. All are
published and available for scrutiny.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Overall Accuracy. We computed accuracy by col-
lapsing across race and GBU distributions to derive a single
ROC curve for each algorithm. ROC curves and AUC scores
4. The training datasets for A2011 are not known. For the DCNN
algorithms the training datasets are described in the original papers.
were calculated to measure face verification performance
accuracy. ROC curves for all figures are plotted on a log-
scale function to show performance at commonly set FAR
= 0.0001 and 0.001 (gray dotted lines) and are race and
gender yoked. Overall accuracy was best for the two newer
algorithms, A2019 and A2017b, followed by A2011, and
A2015 (Fig. 3).
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Figure 3. ROC curves for A2019 (yellow), A2017b (green), A2015 (blue),
A2011 (red). A2019 and A2017b show near perfect performance, followed
by A2011, and A2015.
2.2.2. Yoking. Similarly to overall accuracy, ROC curves
were derived by collapsing across GBU distributions. The
effects of yoking are easily seen on overall accuracy by
comparing results with three yoking conditions. For the no
yoking condition, all available different-identity pairs were
considered, regardless of cross-race and cross-gender status
of identities. For the race-yoking condition, only same-race
different-identity pairs were considered. For the race and
gender-yoking condition, only same-race and same-gender
different-identity pairs were considered. Fig. 4 shows that
algorithms showed yoking effects in the predicted directions
(accuracy decreased as yoking constrains increased), but that
the magnitude of the effects varied. The effect of yoking
on overall accuracy was most evident for both A2011 and
A2015, and less so for A2017b and A2019. (See Lesson 5).
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Figure 4. Yoking effects on accuracy for A2019 (yellow), 2017b (green),
A2015 (blue), A2011 (red), for no yoking (dashed), race yoking (solid),
and race and gender yoking (dotted).
2.3. Race Bias
2.3.1. ROC Curves. Verification accuracy on East Asian
and Caucasian faces was calculated. AUC results for al-
gorithms A2015, A2019 and A2017b appear in Table 1.
As can be seen, by the AUC measure, performance is
near ceiling (AUC = 1.0) in all cases. By this account,
all four algorithms show little to no race bias on overall
accuracy for Caucasian and East Asian faces. Examination
of the verification estimates at low FARs, however, tell a
different story (Fig. 5). These reveal effects of race bias
for all algorithms. For A2019 and A2017b, there was no or
little bias for FARs larger than 0.001; however, for smaller
FARs there was bias. These results demonstrate a case where
overall accuracy (threshold-independent) and accuracy at a
pre-determined threshold (threshold-dependent) may lead to
different conclusions, despite the fact they are internally
consistent (See Lesson 2 and Lesson 3).
TABLE 1. AUC OF ALGORITHMS A2011, A2015, A2017B, AND
A2019 ON CAUCASIAN FACES AND EAST ASIAN FACES.
AUC
Algorithm Caucasians East Asians
A2011 0.981614 0.977027
A2015 0.990328 0.973814
A2017b 0.999670 0.999205
A2019 0.999674 0.999886
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Figure 5. ROC curves for Caucasian (teal) and East Asian (orange) faces for
A2019 (top-left), 2017b (top-right), A2015 (bottom-left), A2011 (bottom-
right). AUC measures showed race bias for A2015 only. However, ROC
curves at low FARs (gray dotted lines) show that all algorithms perform
more accurately for Caucasian faces than for East Asian faces.
2.3.2. Thresholds. We calculated FAR as a function of
the different-identity similarity-scores for East Asian and
Caucasian faces (see Fig. 6). For all four algorithms, the East
Asian threshold function (orange) is always to the right of
the Caucasian function (teal)5. Because of this shift, a fixed
threshold will yield a smaller FAR for Caucasian faces than
5. Because the similarity score scales differ across algorithms, direct
comparisons for threshold shift magnitudes across algorithms is not possi-
ble.
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Figure 6. Threshold functions for Caucasian (teal), East Asian (orange)
faces for A2019 (top-left), A2017b (top-right), A2015 (bottom-left), A2011
(bottom-right). The plot shows a rightward shift for East Asian faces
(orange) relative to Caucasian (teal) faces indicating that equivalent FARs
require a greater threshold for East Asian faces.
for East Asian faces. To obtain the same FAR for both races
will require separate thresholds for both races. (See Lesson
3 and Lesson 5).
2.4. Item Difficulty
Performance on each GBU partition was calculated (Fig.
7). A2019 and A2017b were more accurate than A2015
and A2011 across all three partitions. A2015 had the lowest
verification accuracy for the Good and Bad images, whereas
A2011 had the lowest accuracy for Ugly. These data are
comparable to previous research that shows the trade-off
between A2015 and A2011 in the Bad and Ugly partitions
[42]. Accuracy for the Ugly partition was the lowest across
all three difficulty groups.
2.4.1. Race Bias as a Function of Item Difficulty. The
GBU dataset allows us to examine a novel problem for DC-
NNs, race bias as a function of well-defined item difficulty.
We computed ROC curves for East Asian and Caucasian
faces across the three difficulty levels of GBU (Fig. 8).
Accuracy for the Good partition is nearly perfect for both
East Asian and Caucasian faces. A2015, and to a lesser
extent A2011, showed a race bias in favor of Caucasian
faces at FAR = 0.0001. For the Bad partition, A2017b and
A2019 again showed nearly no race bias, whereas A2011
and A2015 showed greater verification accuracy Caucasian
faces at FAR = 0.0001. For the Ugly partition, no algorithm
achieved perfect performance for either race. All algorithms,
except for A2011, showed greater accuracy for Caucasian
faces compared to East Asian faces. (See Lesson 4).
3. Discussion
We reviewed and analyzed literature published over the
last 50 years from humans and algorithms on race bias
in face recognition. Five lessons in measuring race bias
for algorithms emerged in our review of past work. These
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Figure 7. ROC curves for Item Difficulty. Accuracy for A2019 (yellow),
2017b (green), A2015 (blue), A2011 (red) on Good (top panel), Bad
(middle panel), Ugly (bottom panel). A2019 and A2017b were the most
accurate across all three partitions.
five lessons inform our understanding of the data-driven
and scenario-modeling factors that impact race bias in face
recognition algorithms. These factors are applied to novel
empirical data, which we collected on race bias as a function
of item pair difficulty for three recent DCNN algorithms and
one pre-DCNN algorithm.
To begin, we review data-driven and scenario-based
factors that impact race bias. The sources of bias that a
researcher must consider include the following:
• Data-driven factors:
– sub-population distributions: the population statistics
for demographic groups
– algorithm: the quality of the algorithm’s representations
across demographic groups
– representative images: the subgroup’s representation of
the population of interest
– imaging conditions: the imaging conditions directly
affect the difficulty of comparing images
• Scenario-modeling:
– threshold: appropriate selection of threshold for a de-
sired FAR for each racial group, independently
– demographic-pairing: modeling the homogeneity of the
different-identity distribution
This is the first study to consider the full range of
factors that impact race bias in face recognition algorithms.
Attention to race bias factors in past work has often been
piecemeal. For example, common focus has been on the
role of training data, and although this is an important
factor, there remains a broad scope of other factors to
consider. Data-driven factors underlie real differences in an
algorithm’s capacity to recognize faces of different races.
Scenario-based factors are part of the measurement process
and affect estimates of algorithm bias. The complexity of
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Figure 8. East Asian and Caucasian ROC Curves for GBU partitions (A2019, top-left; A2017b, top-right; A2015, bottom-left; A2011, bottom-right). Top
panel: Good and Bad partitions (left and right) show nearly perfect accuracy for A2019 and A2017b for all faces. A2015 shows greater accuracy for
Caucasian faces. Bottom panel: Ugly partition, shows some degree of race bias for all algorithms except A2011.
these factors, and their potential to interact, makes a general
assessment of bias for face recognition algorithms unfea-
sible. Consequently, race bias must be measured for each
particular scenario, algorithm, race, and dataset.
The empirical data presented here provides two addi-
tional key contributions to the burgeoning literature on race
bias. First, an updated analysis of race bias across three gen-
erations of face recognition algorithms (pre-DCNN, older
DCNN, and two newer DCNNs) provides insight on the
evolution of race bias. We find that with each new generation
of algorithms, accuracy improves for both race groups. How-
ever, results from threshold-dependent measures suggest that
accuracy differences across race groups at specific points of
interest remain problematic. Second, we provide novel find-
ings on the impact of item difficulty on race bias accuracy.
Specifically, as item challenge level increased demographic
differences were magnified.
One limitation in our study was the use of only two
racial groups in our analysis. As noted, the GBU dataset
was selected because of the excellent control it provides of
factors other than race. This photometric and demographic
control makes it ideal for studying race bias, but somewhat
limits the ecological validity. Although the analysis was lim-
ited to two groups, the lessons learned and methodological
considerations apply across all race groups. Moreover, the
focus on only two races allowed us to explore a wide range
of possible factors that may contribute to bias.
This brings us back to the question that motivated this
work. Where are we on measuring race bias? Our find-
ings point to strong improvements across racial groups and
concomitant declines in race bias overall. However, these
gains may vary as a function of item difficulty–a factor that
has not been considered previously in assessing race bias
for algorithms. With the rise of DCNNs, the complexity of
the bias problem increases, due to the need for extremely
large training sets and the large number of parameters that
may impact performance on subsets of faces. Clearly, race
bias in face recognition algorithms is a critical problem that
remains unsolved. Although promising approaches are on
the horizon (cf., [45]), these methods need to be tested
more thoroughly. In many cases, they are still constrained to
work on specific challenges that may, or may not, generalize
to other types of problems. Until a technical solution to
the problem of bias is found, algorithms need to be tested
individually and thoroughly for performance across racial
groups. Our holistic assessment is integral to understanding
that the solution to the race bias problem is not simple or
straightforward. The intricacy of this issue is underscored
by the multitude of underlying factors that impact race
bias. From an applied perspective, each application needs
to measure the bias that accounts for the algorithms, data-
driven factors and scenario conditions. In addition, bias
needs to be continuously monitored, because of changes in
the data characteristics, demographic shifts, and algorithm
updates.
4. Conclusion
The five lessons we present provide a starting point
for developing a principled understanding of how race and
demographic bias should be assessed for face recognition
algorithms. We also considered how image difficulty impacts
these estimates of race bias and how this has changed with
the evolution of face recognition algorithms. At this point
in time, advances in the field require simultaneous attention
to all potential sources of race bias in face recognition algo-
rithms. Both data-driven and scenario-modeling factors and
their interactions can impact race bias in face recognition
algorithms. This holistic assessment provides a realistic and
informed starting point for future studies in this area.
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